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Abstract. Blockchain technology has the potential to provide public services directly to the 
public. This challenges the need for public organizations, who traditionally provided these 
services. Much of the current work is focused on the technology, whereas the influence on public 
administration structure has gained less attention. The goal of this paper is to investigate the 
impact of blockchain technology on the governance of public service provision. For this, we 
performed a case study of an EU-wide system that monitors the movement of excise goods under 
duty suspension. We developed two scenarios for blockchain technology’s use based on a 
permissionless blockchain architecture on the one hand and a permissioned one on the other. The 
scenarios were evaluated based on their impact on transaction validation, data quality and 
governance. The findings show that blockchain technology alone cannot be an alternative for the 
current data quality controls, equal access assurances and adaptations to legislation conducted by 
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public administrations. As such, governments will remain playing a key role in registration of 
documents and assets, however, the governance will likely change depending on the type of 
blockchain architecture. 
Keywords: Public services, Blockchain, Transformation, Public Choice, Transaction Cost, E-
government, Case Study 
Key points for practitioners: 
1. Blockchain technology can fundamentally change the way public services are provided  
2. Blockchain can change the governance role of public administrations from being a 
transaction facilitator to an orchestrator 





The Consequences of Blockchain Architectures for the 
Governance of Public Services – An Case Study of the 
Movement of Excise Goods under Duty Exemptions 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Developments in information and communication technology (ICT) have enabled governments 
to deliver services more efficient, effective and citizen centric (Scholl & Klischewski, 2007). The 
emergence of blockchain technology has emerged that opens up a world of possibilities for 
governments (Ølnes, 2015). Blockchain is a technology allowing actors in a system (called nodes) 
to transact digital assets using a peer-to-peer (P2P) network and storing these transactions in a 
distributed way across the network (Back et al., 2014). Each block contains a signature that is 
based on the exact content (string of data) of that block and is chained to the previous block up 
until the first block. Any participant with access rights can trace back a transactional event 
belonging to any participant at any point in its history. Blocks are recorded across a peer-to-peer 
network, using cryptographic trust and assurance mechanisms which makes them hard to mute 
(Warburg, 2016). In a blockchain both the transaction itself and the owners of the assets that are 
transacted can be registered. Every transaction is validated by the network by employing a 
‘consensus mechanism’. This is a mechanism that allows users to validate the transactions and 
update the registry in the entire network (Warburg, 2016). 
A number of researchers investigating the potential of blockchain in governments expect 
blockchain technology to lead to a changing role of public administrations in society. Davidson, 
De Filippi, and Potts (2016a) argued that this technology can reshape the way governments are 
able to interact with citizens, economic operators, and each other (Davidson, De Filippi, & Potts, 
2016b). This technology is considered to hold the fundamental promise of facilitating direct 
interaction between citizens, providing administration without a governmental administrator and 
tailoring services provided by governments (Alketbi, Nasir, & Talib, 2018; Back et al., 2014). 
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David Shrier, Jaclyn Larossi, Deven Sharma, and Alex Pentland (2016) stated that blockchain 
technology enables us to rethink the current institutions in society, especially as this technology 
can redefine the relationship between government and the citizen in terms of data sharing. They 
argue that the distributed nature of this technology can ensure the integrity of government records 
and services, without the need of a central administration (David Shrier, J Larossi, Deven Sharma, 
& Alex Pentland, 2016). Atzori (2015) concluded that blockchain can provide governmental 
services in a more efficient and decentralized way, allowing for a less hierarchical and more 
horizontal and distributed diffusion of authority. Full traceability and transparency of transactions 
on the ledger create an additional layer of algorithmic trust and algorithmic control over 
governmental organizations, which may shift the balance of power between administration and 
citizens (Meijer & Ubacht, 2018). While an increase in scientific research into this technology 
can be seen, research on blockchain in public administration remains scarce. In a literature review 
of blockchain for the public sector, Ølnes (2015, p. 10) concluded that there is little research in 
this area and proposes to “start researching ways this technology can be utilized by [the] public 
sector”. 
Although e-government initiatives have tried to provide public services more directly, 
decentralized and tailored to the needs of the citizens (Molnar, Janssen, & Weerakkody, 2015), 
the initiatives have never truly changed the role of public organizations in recordkeeping and 
administration. One of the key opportunities provided by blockchain technology is the possibility 
to facilitate direct interactions between public institutions, citizens and economic operators. 
Hence, blockchain technology can reshape the way governments interact with citizens and each 
other (Atzori, 2015), and forces public administrations to rethink their role in public service 
provision. The execution of public services can be governed by blockchain (governance by 
blockchain), whereas the development and evolution of blockchain services need also to be 
governed (governance of blockchain) (Ølnes, Ubacht, & Janssen, 2017). The latter becomes 
important, once blockchain technology is introduced in the public sector. Using this technology, 
governments could take on a supervisory role with regards to the transactions taking place in a 
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blockchain-based infrastructure. Blockchain technology can take away a large part of the 
administrative roles that governments fulfil in society nowadays, which requires a change in the 
governance of the (public) service provision. This can alter the institutional structures, like legal 
institutions and public institutions like we known them today. The governance of public services 
provision will likely be changed caused by the use of blockchain technology and is hence the 
focus of this paper. 
Current blockchain systems that are successful, like Bitcoin, do not require semantic data 
validation on top of the consensus mechanism. Given the relative simplicity of a payment system 
that includes one currency like Bitcoin, these systems can provide full data quality validation 
disintermediation. In these systems, the blockchain system can provide the data quality validation 
in a network setting. The way this works is, very simply put, that each transaction is validated if 
the following two conditions are met: 
I. The sender has a sufficient amount of funds to send the amount of Bitcoins, and 
II. The sender knows the address of the receiver. 
Looking at a more complex data or asset exchange system, in which also the semantics of the data 
is of value, there is still a need for an intermediary to provide this data quality check (Boucher, 
Nascimento, & Kritikos, 2017). The verification on the blockchain is only done on the technical 
requirements of the protocol, so it records the time and details of the transaction. In current 
blockchain systems, if the transaction ticks all the technical requirement boxes, then the 
transaction will become part of the transaction history that is immutable (Warburg, 2016). The 
content of the transaction is not checked in this process (Boucher et al., 2017). Therefore, in more 
complex information exchange processes, such as e-government services, the quality of the data 
in the system cannot be verified with a blockchain system alone. This raises the issues of the 
consequences on the transaction content, how the data quality is safeguarded and how the 
governance in the system is structured to provide required safeguards in e-governments services. 
To explore these consequences of the implementation of blockchain, we performed a case study 
in which we analyse the impact of two different blockchain architectures on three governance 
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aspects of public authorities (transaction content, data quality and governance structure) using 
Transaction Cost theory and Public Choice theory. 
The main research question of this paper is: What are the consequences of blockchain technology 
for the governance role of public administrations for the EMCS system? We explore the 
consequences of two different blockchain architectures for the role of public administrations by 
investigating an in-depth case study. Adding to the analysis of different blockchain architectures 
within a case study should help to deepen the discussion on the impact of blockchain technology 
in government services. We investigated the Excise Movement and Control System (EMCS), 
which is a computerised system for monitoring the movement of excise goods under duty 
suspension in the EU. This case study was chosen since it has high levels of automation which 
makes the use of blockchain technology feasible. We investigated the consequences of the 
implementation of blockchain on the governance of public administrations for two main 
blockchain architectures: permissionless and permissioned blockchain systems. These two 
blockchain architectures differ significantly in the use of the technology and in the way they are 
governed. We use the Public Choice and Transaction Cost theory to analyse the impact on the 
governance. Public Choice theory reflects on the foundations of government and is used because 
it analyses why and how structures like intermediaries, bureaucracies and political behaviour 
emerge. The Transaction Cost theory is used because this theory uses the costs of interactions to 
explain the existence of certain types of organizational structures. An exploratory case study of 
an EU-wide system that monitors the movement of excise goods under duty suspension is used 
to develop two blockchain scenarios. The scenarios are evaluated to determine the consequences 
of using the two blockchain architectures for the governance of public administrations.  
This paper is structured as follows: Section II provides an overview of the research approach. In 
section III the theoretical background is outlined by discussing Public Choice and Transaction 
Cost theory to understand the government structures of public service provision and to explore 
the consequences of blockchain technology on these structures. Section IV presents the 
exploratory case study where the different consequences of using the two blockchain architectures 
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are demonstrated. Section V provides our conclusion, a reflection on the findings, and 
recommendations for future research. 
2. RESEARCH APPROACH 
In this paper, we employed case study research to analyse the potential of blockchain technology 
in governments. The case study was chosen to be able to illuminate the aspects of blockchain use 
in government of which little is known. We investigated the consequences of the implementation 
of different blockchain architectures for the governance role of public administrations using 
Public Choice and Transaction Cost perspectives. A case study approach is suitable for evaluation 
of the consequences of interventions and to explain the mechanisms at work (Yin, 2011). 
Within the case study two scenarios are developed in which blockchain is used to evaluate the 
consequences for public administrations. This case study approach is used because it allows for 
the analysis of the differences between two scenarios for one existing system (Stake, 2005). The 
case study is investigated by studying reports and conducting 11 interviews. The interviewees 
were selected to ensure different perspective and different areas. The case study first outlines the 
current process, after which two scenarios with different blockchain architectures are explored 
for this process. The case study demonstrates the impact of two mayor blockchain architectures 
for the governance role of public administrations.  
3. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
In this section, literature on the implementation of blockchain technology in governments is 
introduced. First, a Public Choice perspective is used to explain the role of governments in 
society. Then, a Transaction Cost perspective is used to explain the role of public administrations 
in transactions.  
3.1 PUBLIC CHOICE THEORIES 
Public Choice theory refers to the perspective of using “economic tools to deal with traditional 
problems of political science” (Tullock, 1987, p. 10). This theory postulates that the main reason 
why public administrations are originally created is to maximize some sort of welfare function 
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for society (Tullock, 1987). Public administrations are created to warrant and protect social 
values, promote the common good and protect collective rights (Atzori, 2015; Green, 1991). 
Governments facilitate coordination in society to smoothen the tensions between the short term 
individual interest and the collective good and to find compromises between the two (Atzori, 
2015; Dahl, 1989). To provide coordination in the most efficient way, public administrations have 
developed administrative organizations. 
Bureaucracies, as introduced by Weber (1992), are administrative systems governing any large 
institution and are characterized by predefined processes and organized hierarchies to provide 
governmental services for citizens (Weber, 1992). Opponents of bureaucracies highlight the 
inefficiencies and limited flexibilities of these bureaucracies to provide services that are requested 
by civilians, leading to a gap between the governmental services that citizens desire and the 
governmental services that are provided (Atzori, 2015; Johnson & Libecap, 1994). The 
hierarchical structures of these bureaucracies are also argued to facilitate the centralization of 
power towards a few top civil servants, bringing about a lack of transparency, the possibility of 
corruption and the potential misuse of power (Antonopoulos, 2014). On the contrary, proponents 
argue that rational and systematic control is needed to facilitate coordination between humans 
(Weber, 1992). Weber (1992) argued that this is essential to avoid chaos in society and that using 
bureaucracies can avoid favouritism and enhance the efficiency of interactions in society. Various 
trends towards the decentralization of governments can be distinguished from this perspective, 
including Proudhon’s social contract, Marxism, Decentralization of the State and IT as source of 
governance decentralization, which outline why and how specific governance roles of public 
administrations arise. 
3.2 TRANSACTION COST THEORY 
Another theory that can be used to explain the role of organizations in registration and information 
exchange processes is the Transaction Cost Theory (Malone, Yates, & Benjamin, 1987; Sarkar, 
Butler, & Steinfield, 1995). This perspective analyses the costs of transacting between two or 
more parties and the quality of the transaction that emerges. This perspective argues that 
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transactions can occur when the cost of transacting is low. If these transaction costs are too high 
for a transaction to occur, then intermediaries can emerge to bring the parties together and lower 
the transactions costs. Throughout history, society has formed institutions like governments, 
banks and platforms to function as these kinds of intermediaries.  
From a Transaction Cost perspective, blockchain technology can impact the governance role of 
public administrations. Public administrators traditionally take on the role of intermediaries in a 
network to lower transaction costs for transactions that governments deem important, like tax 
collection and land property trading. In these services, continuity is required as they are claimed 
to be critical for citizens’ rights, welfare and the common good. Public organizations facilitate 
coordination between citizens/economic operators, in order to protect the common good, reduce 
opportunism and avoid the abuse of the network (Atzori, 2015; Klievink & Janssen, 2008). The 
public administration is often not involved in the actual transaction of a real-life product, but can 
also just facilitate the market transaction by providing the registration or by assisting in the 
process of information exchange (Janssen & Sol, 2000). There are generally three governance 
roles of public administrations in the coordination between the providing citizen/economic 
operator and the receiving citizen/economic operator: as a complete intermediator, as a supervisor 
or no role in the coordination at all (Janssen & Sol, 2000). This is schematically presented in 
Figure 1. 
[Fig. 1] 
Based on the Public Choice and Transaction Cost perspectives, we follow the perspective that 
governments are created to protect the common good and facilitate interaction between 
citizens/economic operators and to enable consensus and coordination between heterogeneous or 
distant citizens/economic operators. Public administrations function as intermediaries to (1) 
provide this coordination as the transaction costs are too high to have direct transactions, and (2) 
to regulate networks to provide continuity of governmental services as they are critical to citizens’ 
rights, welfare and the common good. The theories suggest that the scenarios should be evaluated 
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on transaction content, data quality (Transaction Cost theory) and Governance (Public Choice 
theory). 
4. CASE STUDY 
To explore the impact of two different blockchain architectures on governance aspects of public 
authorities, we performed a case study in which we compare two blockchain architectures for the 
governance role of (inter)national authorities. We present our analysis in next subsections, where 
we analyse the impact of the two scenarios on: 
• Transaction content (Transaction Cost theory) 
• Data quality (Transaction Cost theory) 
• Governance (Public Choice theory) 
4.1 CASE STUDY BACKGROUND 
This case study investigates the consequences of the implementation of two scenarios for a system 
that monitors excise goods under duty suspension within the territory of the EU: the Excise 
Movement and Control System (EMCS). The two scenarios differ in terms of the blockchain 
architecture: permissionless versus a permissioned blockchain system. The impact on the 
transaction validation, data quality and governance in the network of the two scenarios is 
compared . First, the current EMCS is explained. Then, both the permissionless and the 
permissioned blockchain architectures are explored for this process. Last, an overview of the 
consequences of an EMCS using the two blockchain architectures is presented. 
Currently, to facilitate information exchange between traders and national authorities in the 
countries of the trade, the Excise Movement and Control System (EMCS) workflow management 
system is used. It is used to complete a digital declaration form that moves from the trader in the 
country of dispatch, to a receiver in the country of destination. Each country currently has its own 
National Excise Application (NEA), in which the sender and receiver complete the dispatch data. 
The National Authority of each country must validate the data input in the transaction, after which 
the digital document is sent to the other National Authority. The current EMCS is a centralized 
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system, but each transaction is validated by the two connected NEAs of the Member States. The 
content of the transaction is an overview of the content of the goods that are being sent, including 
the time and date of dispatch and arrival. The quality of data is ensured by manual validation at 
the authorities of each Member States in the NEA, which is only performed on a random basis. 
The governance is structured only at Member State level: the sender is responsible for declaring 
the right amount of goods and the Authority is responsible for validating the transaction. Figure 
2 presents a simplified visualization of the EMCS that is used for cross-border trading of excise 
goods in the EU. 
[Fig. 2] 
4.2 BLOCKCHAIN ARCHITECTURES FOR PUBLIC SERVICE PROVISION 
For the case two scenarios were developed based on permissionless and permissioned 
blockchains. The difference lies in the openness of participation in the consensus mechanism of 
the blockchain system. In other words, the blockchain types differ in who can participate in 
validating the transactions: 
I. Permissionless blockchains allow all nodes to participate in the consensus mechanism; 
II. Permissioned blockchains have the transaction consensus mechanism performed by a 
given set of participating nodes, based on criteria determined by the architect of the 
permissioned blockchain. 
To demonstrate the consequences of the implementation of these two blockchain architectures for 
public administrations, a real-life governmental information exchange process on both a 
permissionless and a permissioned blockchain is explored in the next section. 
4.3 SCENARIO I: PERMISSIONLESS BLOCKCHAIN 
Looking at the consequences of a permissionless blockchain architecture for the EMCS system, 
the peer-to-peer transactions would reduce the effort for both the traders and the national 
authorities as data only should be entered once instead of multiple times. Consequently, it will 
also cause the system to be less human-error prone. However, permissionless blockchains would 
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enable transactions to be validated without complying with regulations, as anyone can participate 
in the consensus mechanism. This consensus mechanism requires more than 50% of the nodes to 
confirm the transaction. Traders can for example pool together and combine for more than 50% 
of the verification power in the network, shifting the control to this group that might have 
malicious intentions. In addition, the reason why National Authorities are currently validating the 
data input in every transaction, is to make sure that all taxes are paid and thereby promoting the 
common good of tax collection. Shifting the validation control to the network, the majority of the 
traders are responsible for the correctness of the data input and thereby the fact that all taxes are 
paid. Traders are argued to be primarily economically driven, so it can hardly be expected that 
the whole network will feel responsible for making sure all taxes are collected and the common 
good is protected.  
The content of the transactions will only include meta-details of the actual transaction, as the 
value of the goods will be declared but not the content of the transaction. The quality of the data 
is determined by data input of the sender, and the governance of the system is completely 
distributed. Therefore, the responsibility of the data quality in the system is completely distributed 
to the traders as well. 
This permissionless blockchain system leads to the disintermediation of the public 
administrations at the technical validation level, which could increase the potential of fraud and 
present a threat to the common good. The National Authorities involved would be completely 
sidelined in terms of data quality safeguarding, as they will only be able to see the transaction log 
but not be able to provide any supervisory or facilitating role. Figure 3 presents a visualization of 
the EMCS system using a permissionless blockchain. 
[Fig. 3] 
4.4 SCENARIO II: PERMISSIONED BLOCKCHAIN 
If the EMCS system would use a permissioned blockchain, the system could also benefit from the 
enhanced data integrity as is the case in the permissionless blockchain system. The architect of a 
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permissioned blockchain system can however also regulate who can participate in the system and 
who can participate in the consensus mechanism. To ensure the right amount of tax collection and 
to reduce fraud, the system should ensure that traders provide the right data in the monitoring 
system. A permissioned blockchain system for this process would not completely remove the 
need for semantic validation by governmental authorities in the process, which can be provided 
if the validating nodes (the actors performing the consensus mechanism) are the National 
Authorities.  
The content of the transactions of the blockchain would include the complete transaction details 
as permissioned blockchain system is less limited by scalability issues compared to permissioned 
systems. The data quality is still determined by the traders who provide the input in the system, 
but as the validating nodes will be the national authorities, the governance will not be completely 
distributed. The power to validate or alter wrongfully validated transactions will still be at the 
public organizations. 
From a governance perspective, a permissioned blockchain architecture would still change the 
governance role of the National Authorities involved. They would move from being the facilitator 
of the data exchange process in every transaction (as is currently the case in the National Excise 
Applications), towards a role where they can check and control when necessary. This enables the 
regulation of the data input in the system, which leads to the appropriate amount of tax collection 
and thereby the promotion of the common good. This permissioned blockchain system leads to a 
changed governance role of the national authorities from a facilitator to a supervisor, as it would 
facilitate peer-to-peer transactions between the traders, while regulating the critical input in the 
system. Figure 4 presents a visualization EMCS using a permissioned blockchain system. 
[Fig. 4] 
5. CONSEQUENCES  
As can be seen in the two scenarios, there are consequences for the governance role of the public 
administration. The consequences vary based on the blockchain architecture that is used for the 
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blockchain implementation. In the case of a permissionless excise duty system, this could lead to 
completely side-lined national authorities, increasing the potential of fraud and presenting a threat 
to the common good. In the case of a permissioned excise duty system, the governance role of 
public administrations could shift to a more supervisory role. The permissioned blockchain 
system would enable peer-to-peer transactions and enhance data integrity, while the national 
authorities would still be able to provide semantic validation and thereby regulating the 
infrastructure. An overview of consequences of blockchain architectures for the transaction 
content, the data quality and governance structure of public administrations in an EMCS system 
as presented in the two scenarios is displayed in Table 1. In scenario II governments play an 
important role in governing transactions. They should ensure the data quality and play a trusted 
role for ensuring this.  
[Table 1] 
In the EMCS case study, it is displayed that permissionless blockchains present a complete 
disintermediation of public administrations in information exchange or registration processes, 
with limited ways of interfering in the process as a government. Even though they lower the 
transaction costs compared to the centralized EMCS system that is currently in place, the public 
sector is unable to guarantee the continuity of the service. The control of the governance in the 
network will be completely distributed and in the hands of the validating nodes in the network, 
giving them significant power over the governmental service. In many governmental services, 
continuity is required to protect the common good and facilitate interaction in society, which 
cannot be automatically guaranteed in permissionless blockchains. 
On the contrary, permissioned blockchains enable a changing governance role of public 
administrations: from a facilitator towards a supervisor, presenting re-intermediation in public 
administrations. These blockchains are still somewhat centralized in terms of control, as they are 
closed systems and the architect of the system can impose participation rules, which is necessary 
to ensure the protection of the common good and facilitate interaction in society. The 
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implementation of permissioned blockchains can allow public administrators to provide this level 
of trust and protect the common good while lowering transaction costs. Also, this allows public 
administration to deal with exceptions, as the assumption that every citizen can transact is not 
realistic. People might be illiterate or not digital savvy or simply do not fit the standards and 
norms. In current situation public organizations have the discretionary power to deal with 
exceptions. Permissioned blockchains allow for the necessary semantic data quality checks to 
ensure the appropriate data quality in the system as can be seen in Table 1, which is not provided 
by the blockchain technology itself. 
Therefore, permissioned blockchains present the next step in e-government as they provide 
benefits to governments that were not feasible with traditional information technologies while 
ensuring continuity of governmental services. Blockchain can reduce the amount of human labour 
involved in the process and thereby reduce the chance of human errors. Also, as all actors in the 
network have a copy of the register, blockchain technology can increase transparency, auditability 
and automation. In an EMCS using a permissioned blockchain architecture, the traders do not 
need to trust the intermediary anymore to keep verify the right transactions, the traders just need 
to trust the technology and the mathematics of the blockchain. Therefore, using a permissioned 
blockchain architecture for the EMCS system can increase the trust of citizens and companies in 
governmental processes and recordkeeping. 
6. CONCLUSION 
Blockchain technology can be used to provide public services without the involvement of public 
organizations. In this way blockchain technology can lower the transactions costs and removes 
the roles of public organizations to validate transactions and provide services. However, public 
organizations conduct more activities than merely providing services. They ensure that public 
services are updated and modified, citizens are treated equally and fair, non-digital savvy citizens 
have access and warrant other public values. Furthermore, there might be exceptions that should 
be handled by the discretionary power of the public agency. Although blockchain can be used for 
the direct and distributed registration of documents and assets for public services, government 
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organizations keep on playing a key role. The use of blockchain technology results in a shift from 
executing centralized registrations and public services, towards governing blockchain 
implementations by ensuring data quality, dealing with exceptional situations and adapting to 
changes in legislations. 
The case study that explores the two blockchain architectures for the information exchange 
process facilitated by public administrations showed that the governance by public 
administrations will change when implementing a blockchain architecture. A permissionless 
blockchain architecture would distribute the responsibility for the data quality and transaction 
validation to the network. With this architecture, public administrations have no means to 
intervene or correct the transactions on the blockchain, limiting or even completely removing the 
governance role of public administrations in these networks. Yet there might be exceptions, like 
illiterate citizens in need of a service. A permissioned blockchain architecture enables the 
opportunity for public administrations to be the validating nodes in the blockchain system. This 
only partly distributes the responsibility for the data quality to the network, while keeping the 
ability to intervene and correct transactions. This changes the governance role of public 
administrations from a transaction facilitator towards an orchestrator in the network.  
The case study scenarios also show that the architecture of the blockchain system must be 
carefully designed for governments to safeguard the public values that they deem important. The 
two scenarios display that the consequences of the implementation of blockchain technology for 
e-government services for the governance role of public administrations are dependent on the 
architecture of the blockchain system.  
Blockchain is underexplored in government. Two major blockchain architectures were 
investigated in this research: permissionless and permissioned blockchains. The difference 
between the two types originates from the openness of the consensus mechanism within the 
blockchain architecture. However, many other variations of blockchain architectures exist. For 
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example, there can be variation in the way the validating nodes are rewarded or the openness to 
external actors to view transaction logs. More research in these types of design is needed. 
In this research we assumed that blockchain systems did not provide semantic checks for data 
input. This highlights the inability of fully distributing the control to the network in permissioned 
blockchain systems. Further research is suggested exploring the possibility of adding semantic 
validation by the network in these systems, moving away from technical validation alone. This 
would entail more research into both the technical details of this semantic validation by the 
network and into the governance structures of the network. This would pave the way for 
permissionless blockchains to provide governmental services as well.  
Further research into the impact of these blockchain architectures on the intersection of the 
technology and the institutions is needed. Implementing blockchain technology for governmental 
services might not only present a changing governance role for public administrations, but could 
for example also present a loss of jobs and exacerbate the digital divide in society. Research into 
drawing up an inventory of these effects is recommended to avoid unintended consequences when 
implementing this technology in the public sector. Finally, research into the attitudes towards this 
technology within public administrations could accelerate blockchain adoption. Investigating the 
perceptions of public administrators towards blockchain technology could result in a mapping of 
the barriers for adoption in the public sectors and can be used as a departure point for removing 
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Table 1. Overview of consequences of blockchain architectures for the governance role of public 
administrations in an EMCS system 
Aspect EMCS as is 
Scenario I: Permissionless 
blockchain 




Complete declaration form 




Full transaction details 
including time-stamps 
Data quality 
Input by traders is validated 
and corrected by national 
authorities 
Determined by the traders 
only 
Determined by the traders 
but national authorities have 
means to validate and 
correct 
Governance 
Authorities are responsible for 
transaction validation and data 
quality 
Completely distributed, full 
responsibility to the traders 
Centralized as the validating 
nodes are national 
authorities, but different 
governance role as public 
administrations move from 






Fig. 1. Levels of intermediation by public administrations [based on Janssen & Sol (2000)] 
Fig. 2. The current situation of the EMCS 
Fig. 3. The EMCS using a permissionless blockchain 
Fig. 4. The EMCS using a permissioned blockchain  
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